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Abstract. A recent article by Gergen suggests that social psychology
cannot reasonably aspire to the general time-independent laws that are
characteristic of the physical sciences. Consideration of this thesis
suggests that the underlying rationale may place undue reliance on the
effects of psychological enlightenment, and on the individual’s needs to
demonstrate his behavioral freedom and uniqueness. A tentative generali-
zation suggests that the processes underlying social behavior may be
relatively stable, but that they operate on an endless variety of social
contents (conditions) to yield the diverse social behaviors and relation-
ships that we observe.
Gergen’s recent article on &dquo;Social Psychology as History&dquo; (1973) raises
a number of issues that warrant serious consideration. Gergen’s main thesis
is that social psychology cannot reasonably aspire to the sort of general
time-independent laws that characterize such disciplines as physics,
chemistry, and biology. Instead, he argues that social psychological laws
will almost inevitably be time-bound, mainly reflecting the social norms and
personality constellations that were dominant at a particular time and place.
The instability of social psychology is presumed to derive in large part
from the feedback that social scientists produce for the public at large.
Individuals who hear about the principles of social science are likely to be
changed as a result, and may subsequently act in ways that are inconsistent
with previously enunciated &dquo;laws.&dquo; An important consideration here is the
fact that social psychological accounts often include clearcut value-judgments
regarding &dquo;good&dquo; and &dquo;bad&dquo; forms of behavior. The consumer of such informa-
tion is thus likely to alter his characteristic modes of response to avoid
censure. As a result of these prescriptive pressures the social scientist
may well find that the publication and acceptance of his work is likely to
produce a substantial weakening (or disappearance) of the phenomenon he has
worked so hard to establish. A paper by Bronfenbrenner (1958) provides us
with an excellent example, showing that the severe and nonpermissive social-
ization practices formerly associated with middle-class upbringing were
substantially altered in the years following World War II. By and large,
the observed changes reflected systematic shifts toward the sorts of rearing
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patterns that were advocated by experts in such publications as the U. S.
Children’s Bureau Bulletins.2
Gergen feels that the individual’s need to see himself as a unique and
freely-acting agent is another important factor that contributes to the
instability of social psychological principles. The individual who learns
about some behavioral &dquo;law&dquo; is thought to feel belittled by the suggestion
that his actions may be predictable from an abstract impersonal formula-
tion ; as a result, Gergen reasons, he will often reassert his freedom by
acting in ways designed to invalidate the experts’ theories.
Apart from these influences that derive rather directly from social
research, Gergen suggests that other forms of cultural change may undermine
the stability of our &dquo;laws.&dquo; Many social predispositions are a consequence
of learning, and individuals who are reared in different times and places
are unlikely to develop the same pattern of motives, values, and propensities.
Hence, Gergen reasons, they may fail to develop those characteristics that are
necessary ingredients for some of our hallowed &dquo;universal&dquo; principles.
Gergen’s concern with timelessness attacks what Campbell and Stanley
(1963) have referred to as the external validity of social psychological
research. In essence, he tells us, the relationships we have observed here-
tofore are likely to be altered if we repeat our investigations under somewhat
different circumstances (e.g., using respondents who are more enlightened
about social science, or people whose dominant values and~motivations have
been changed in some important way). Clearly, this is a real possibility.
Contrary to Gergen’s thesis, however, it does not rule out the possible
discovery of stable social psychological principles. The background factors
that affect social phenomena may, for example, operate in a replicable,
systematic fashion. If this proves to be the case, we might ultimately
develop a typology of persons and situations to serve as moderator variables,
specifying the circumstances in which a given relationship is likely to be
observed, and where it is unlikely to appear. A contingent generalization
designed to meet such complications might look something like this: In an
egalitarian society, democratic leadership yields relatively high morale;
in an authoritarian society, by contrast, there is virtually no relation-
ships between democratic leadership and group morale.
The timelessness issue is, of course, an empirical question and its
proper resolution may vary from one substantive problem to the next.
Nonetheless, despite the difficulties involved in predicting future develop-
ments, there are several reasons for believing that Gergen’s pessimistic
views may be too severe.
1. Enlightenment effects. Gergen contends that enlightenment regarding
social psychology may substantially alter the individual’s behavior. Having
faithfully read his psychology assignment, our college sophomore may now know
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about conformity effects and may respond differently than the undergraduates
of an earlier day when serving as an experimental subject. Would a nonrepli-
cation of this sort invalidate the principles that relate conformity to group
pressures? Probably not. It would, however, force us to recognize that the
original conformity principle required further specification, to take account
of the respondent’s knowledge regarding conformity effects. In brief, one
might contend that the timelessness of the earlier conformity findings could
not logically be challenged by data obtained,from respondents who differed
significantly (in enlightenment) from those who had been observed in the
original experiments.
Unfortunately, while this line of argument seems impeccably valid, it is
of limited utility, for if it is generally true that enlightened respondents
fail to show the same effects that are observed in the unenlightened, as time
goes on and increasing numbers become enlightened, we may find ourselves with
virtually no one to whom our original formulations apply. Thus, we would be
left with a valid theory that is applicable to a shrinking (and ultimately
nonexistent) population of the unenlightened.
In contrast to the scenario sketched above, however, enlightenment
effects may be less critical than Gergen has assumed. Understanding of a
general principle need not render it inoperative, particularly if we fail to
see the manner in which a given principle might apply to the specific situa-
tion in which we find ourselves. The specialist in learning theory is probably
just as susceptible to partial reinforcement effects as anyone else,
particularly if he fails to notice (or recall) the contingencies associated
with a particular behavioral pattern. Similarly, while Gergen suggests that
behavior modification techniques are ineffective when applied to people who
are conversant with its theoretical premises, it has been my understanding
that these methods often work best when the individual who is being treated
is made fully aware of the relevant principles and of the particular rein-
forcement contingencies that the therapist plans to apply (Bandura, 1969).
Related considerations apply within the realm of social psychology.
Virtually everyone who has taken a course in social psychology is familiar
with the principle which holds that a trustworthy, knowledgeable communicator
will usually produce more attitude change than a less credible source. None-
theless, it seems reasonably certain that this principle is applicable to both
the enlightened and the unenlightened without any major modification. That
is, professors of social psychology (along with practically everybody else)
are more likely to be influenced by communicators they trust and regard as
experts, as contrasted with those who strike them as untrustworthy and/or
misinformed.
Here is another counterexample. There is substantial evidence that we
typically reject those whose attitudes conflict with our own beliefs (Byrne,
1969). This principle is doubtless familiar to most students of social
psychology (and perhaps to others as well). It seems unlikely, nonetheless,
that once we understand the law we are thereby freed from its implications,
and from that time forward evaluate others in a fashion that is unaffected
by their beliefs. 
’
As a final set of counterexamples, we might consider some of the ways
in which children are affected by the behavior of their parents. The likeli-
hood that a given child will emerge as a smoker (versus nonsmoker) is
predictable in part from the smoking behavior of his parents; similarly,
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political and religious affiliations tend to be transmitted across genera-
tions. While I do not know of any data in these areas that specifically
address the present issue, it seems highly unlikely that these parent-child
correlations would be substantially affected if the available information
about cross-generational influences was more widely recognized than it is
today. Similarly, the testimony of our clinical colleagues does not seem
to support the view that a person who learns about the looking-glass self
can, through this form of enlightenment, alleviate deep-seated feelings of
inadequacy that derive from an extended pattern of parental derogation
(Cooley, 1922; Mead, 1934). ,
2. Much of Gergen’s argument seems to be based on the assumption that
the average person is strongly influenced by the need to demonstrate his
uniqueness and behavioral independence despite the nomothetic theorizing
of social scientists. While these motives may indeed influence our actions
at times, it seems unlikely that they are a pervasive and powerful deter-
minant of behavior. Surely this type of motivation is not one of the
&dquo;locked in&dquo; predispositions that Gergen accepts as the likely basis for a
generally valid principle of social behavior. Moreover, even among those
who have strongly developed &dquo;uniqueness motives,&dquo; it is likely that these
considerations are often overshadowed by other, more compelling influences.
When selecting a marriage partner, casting a vote, or choosing a career,
the need to confound the nomothetic theorizer must surely figure as a low
priority consideration, if it is operative at all. ,
3. Changes due to learning. Gergen notes that while social learning
approaches would seem to provide a theoretical solution to the instabilities
that result from cultural change, even a doctrine as firmly established as
reinforcement theory may require periodic restatement and re-examination,
because the events that function as reinforcements in one time and place
may prov‘e less potent in other cultural settings. This is undeniably true,
and yet the example does not seem very damaging. The investigator who is
interested in reinforcement phenomena is not likely to be terribly disturbed
by the discovery of a more diet-conscious society in which the behavior of
school children is unaffected by the presentation of M&M candies, but can,
instead, be strikingly reinforced by vitamin pills. The fact that we can
systematically affect the reinforcement value of different substances and
events by altering the individual’s life history is surely to be expected
and is not a matter of major scientific (as opposed to technological)
concern. The traditional conception of a timeless law would be more
severely shaken, however, by a demonstration that cultural changes can not
only alter the specific events that serve as reinforcers, but that some of
the classic &dquo;laws&dquo; of reinforcement can also be changed. For example, if
the relationship between partial reinforcement and resistance to extinction
proved to be an ephemeral phenomenon which was not applicable to children
of the 1980’s, then the reinforcement theorist might truly feel threatened
in his timeless ivory tower. Even then, however, our hardy theorist would
surely attempt to systematize these phenomena, hoping to reach some general
statement regarding the social and biological factors that are critical for
the demonstration of this classic relationship.
Perhaps this analysis of the timeless versus timebound aspects of
reinforcement theory can provide us with a model for the sorts of things
that are likely to prove stable despite cultural changes. A tentative
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generalization might be that the processes underlying social behavior are
probably relatively stable, although they operate on an endless variety of
social contents as we vary the time and place of our investigations. For
example, the process of fear conditioning may follow a fairly uniform course,
even though the particular things we fear depend largely upon changing
historical circumstances. Similarly, as has been suggested most forcefully
by Chomsky and his followers, the cognitive processes involved in communica-
tion may be universal, even though the things we talk about may vary virtually
without limit, given our diverse interests and life experiences (see, for
example, Lenneberg, 1967). Piaget’s work may be seen in this same light,
as focusing upon certain universal processes (e.g., assimilation and accommo-
dation) that may be engaged in an endless variety of cognitive tasks. Lastly,
one might speculate about the possibility that the defense mechanisms of
psychoanalytic theory reflect universal processes that may be applied to
reduce a wide range of anxieties (contexts) which vary widely from one social
group to the next.
Dorwin Cartwright has suggested (in an informal conversation) that the
present content-process distinction may roughly parallel Lewin’s distinction
between phenotypic and genotypic laws. The main notion here is that despite
changes in the observed phenotypic relationships between a given set of
variables, diverse findings may nonetheless be consistent with a single
underlying genotypic law as it affects social behavior in a variety of times
and places. The changing (phenotypically inconsistent) relationship between
social class and child-rearing practices that Bronfenbrenner noted (1958), may
thus be encompassed within the genotypical proposition that behavior patterns
are often changed through the persuasive influence of trusted experts.
Gergen contends that the &dquo;historical dependency of psychological prin-
ciples is most notable in areas of focal concern to the public.&dquo; This its
doubtless true, since the questions of focal concern to the population at
large are almost always phrased in terms of specific content-problems (e.g.,
drug usage, political activism, social values). In order to deal with such
issues it is clear that we must understand more than the underlying processes
of identification and motivation, if these are indeed the processes that are
involved; we must also comprehend the particular historical circumstances
(contents) that interacted with these processes to yield the problems that
now confront us. And it is, of course, quite likely that changing historical
circumstances may make it difficult to develop a timeless theory which can
validly be applied to a particular social phenomenon as it is manifested in
different times and places. Hence it is not surprising to find that the
variables which were predictive of political activism in the early years of
the Vietnam War were substantially different from those that proved predic-
tive in later years (Gergen, 1973).
Does this mean that the investigator who tries to study a stable
psychological process will often find that his work is of limited interest
to the overwhelming majority of the public? This is indeed very likely to
be the case. And is it also true that the content-oriented investigator
will have a greater chance.to bask in the public limelight? Yes, he will,
although as Gergen suggests, the generalizations he uncovers are likely to
have a limited lifespan.
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